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RECENT CASES

resulting from a Sheriff's Deed" in an foreclosure action."
However, this does not result in a harmonizing reasoning, inasmuch as the severance of the title of the mineral estate from
the surface estate creates two distinct and separate parcels of
land, and it therefore naturally follows that title to one cannot be adverse to the other regardless of the method by which
possession was authorized to the surface estate.
F. C. ROHRICH
CIVIL RIGHTS - ACTION FOR DAMAGES LITY OF POLICE OFFICERS FOR VIOLATION
UNDER COLOR OF STATE LAW. Defendants,

PERSONAL LIABIOF CIVIL RIGHTS

thirteen Chicago
police officers, broke into plaintiff's home in the early morning forcing plaintiff and his family to stand naked in the living room while conducting an extensive search of the premises. Plaintiff was then taken to the police station, as a suspect, and held for ten hours of interrogation, was not allowed
to call an attorney or be taken before a magistrate, and was
subsequently released without criminal charges being preferred against him. Alleging that the defendants, though lacking a search warrant or warrant of arrest, acted "under color
of the statutes, ordinances, regulations, customs and usages"
of Illinois and the City of Chicago, plaintiff sued defendants
for violation of his civil rights.' On writ of certiorari the Sa14. North Dakota Horse & Cattle Co. v. Serumgard, 17 N.D. 466, 117 N.W.
453 (1908); See N.D. Cent. Code § 32-10-09 (1961).
...
Conveys
15. Knowlton v. Coye, 76 N.D. 478, 37 NW.2d 343 (1949),
to the grantee the same title which the mortgagor possessed at time of
execution of the mortgage .... ," Stewart v. Berg, 65 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.
1954), "...
Does not invalidate the proceedings against unknown defendants ... ;" See N.D. Cent. Code § 32-17-06 (1961).
1. The action was based on 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952),
which provides:
"ERvery person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
In, determining the civil liability of the defendants the Court was not primarily concerned with whether they had acted in accqrdance with their
authority or had misused it, see Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), but was concerned With the narrower
issue of whether "Congress, in enacting (17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1952) ), meant to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional
rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position."
(81 Sup. Ct. 473, 476 (1961) ). Previous cases relative to this question have
been brought on the basis of 62 Stat. 683 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948),
which is the criminal counterpart of 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1952), and in supporting jurisdiction of the federal courts under 17 Stat.
13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952) in the immediate case, the Court relied
entirely on cases dealing with interpretation of the "under color of" clause
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preme Court of the-United States held,' that even though the
actions of defendants were not taken in conformity with the
statutes of Illinois they were acting "under color of state law"
by reason of their position as police officers and hence were
individually liable to plaintiff in damages for breach of plaintiff's constitutional rights.' Monroe v. Pape, 81 Sup. Ct. 473
(1961).
In deciding that 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1952)
of the Civil Rights Act gives a remedy in federal courts to
parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and im-

munities by a state official's abuse of his position, the Supreme Court has established a rule which may conceivably
overrule a great many prior cases dismissing complaints
against state law enforcement officers on the basis of insufficient jurisdiction.' This is the Court's most affirmative statement that federal jurisdiction is not merely limited to action
taken by officials pursuant to state law,5 a clearly expansionary interpretation of the statute. Justices Harlan and Stewart in their concurring opinion contended that there should
be no distinction between "use" and "misuse" of state power
in regard to interpretation of the "color of state law" clause
of § 1983.' Thus whether the deprivation of rights alleged results from an application of authority vested directly by state
law or whether the deprivation results from a misuse of
authority granted by state law (in which case there would be
in 62 Stat. 683 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948). Williams v. United States,
341 U.S. 97 (1951); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
2. The district court had dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaint failed to state a claim, and this ruling was upheld by the circuit court of appeals. Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1959). Justice
Frankfurter alone dissented in an opinion cited at 81 Sup. Ct. 473, 492
(1961). Also separtely attacked concurring opinion by Justices Harlan and
Stewart at p. 516.
3. While reversing the decision as to liability of the individual police
officers the court affirmed dismissal of the municipality of Chicago on the
ground that the statute was not intended to include city corporations for
acts committed in performance of its governmental functions. See O'Connor v. City of Minneapolis, 182 F. Supp. 494 (D. Minn. 1960); Graves v.
City of Bolivar, 154 F. ,Supp. 625 (W. D. Mo. 1957).
4. Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1959); Curry v. Ragen, 257 F.
2d 449 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 851 (1958); Mackey v. Chandler,
152 F. Supp. 579 (W.D.S.C. 1957); Agnew v. Compton, 239 F.2d 226 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied 353 U.S. 95'9 (1957). See also Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.
2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959); Atterbury v. lRagen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956),
cert. denied 353 U.S. 964 (1956); Dye v. Cox, 125 F. Supp. 714 (7th Cir.
1953).
5. See United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956); Brown
v. United States, 204 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1953); United States v. Lynch, 94
F. Supp. 1011 (N.D. Ga. 1950), affrd 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied
342 U.S. 831 (1951); Screws v.* United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); Culp v.
United States, 131 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 1942); Taylor v. DeHart, 22 F.2d 206
(W.D. Mo. 1926), aff'd 274 U.S. 726 (1927).
6. See generally the cases cited at footnote 9, Infra.
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an obvious ground for a state action) the injured party may
seek redress initially in the federal courts under § 1983. As
Justice Douglas states in the majority opinion: "Itis no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give
relief. The Federal remedy is supplementary to the State and
the state remedy need not be first sought and refused before
the Federal one is invoked."'
One of the earliest decisions which denied federal jurisdiction for alleged violations of constitutional rights was
Barney v. City of New York,' which held that the 14th Amendmont did not apply to action by a state official which
violates state law, since such action did not constitute the act
of the state. More recent decisions, however, in interpreting
the "color of state law" clause of the Civil Rights Statutes in
regard to violations by law enforcement officers of constitutional rights, have more liberally defined it to include "misuse
of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible
only because the wrongdoer is clothed with authority of state
law."' Indeed there can be an express intention not to act in
an official capacity" or the act can be directly violative of'a

state law" and the conduct can still be considered to be under
color of law for purposes of applying the Civil Rights Statutes.
Although there seems to be little uniformity in the interpretation and application of the Civil Rights Statutes," the principal case seems to be following the more liberal trend as indicated by affirmative application of the statutes in many varying cases."
7. 81 Sup. Ct. 473, 482 (1961).
8. 193 U.S. 430 (1904). Nine years later this theory was seemingly rejected in Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278
(1913), which reinstated the original view taken in Ex parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339 (1880). Also see Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944) which questioned the reasoning of the Barney case. For a thorough history of the
cases dealing with the Civil Rights Statutes, see Frantz, The New Supreme
Court Decisions on the Federal Civil Rights Statutes, 11 Law. Guild Rev.
142 (1951).
9. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941), based on 62 Stat.
683 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1948), the criminal section of the Civil Rights
Statutes. See also Davis v. Turner, 197 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1952) which is
similar to the immediate case factually, and Screws v. United States, 325
U.S. 91 (1951). And see cases based on 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.SC. § 1983
(1952) supporting this statement: Baldwin v. Morgan, 251 F.2d 780 (5th
Cir. 1958); Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1959); and generally
cases in footnote 4, supra.
10. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
11. See United States v. Walker, 216 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied 348 U.S. 95'9 (1955); United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.
1953); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
12. See Federal Civil Rights Act: A Judicial Repeal, 9 DePaul L. Rev.
230 (1961). This article was stimulated by the opinion of the circuit court
of -appeals in dismissing the principal case. Monroe v. Pape, 272 F.2d 365
(7th Cir. 1959).
13. As where confessions were exacted by law officers by means of vio-

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 37

Justice Frahkfurter, in conformity with his previous opinions," contends that the Civil Rights Statutes have no appli-

cation to cases where the state law has been violated and consequently where the injured party has ample remedy available in the state courts.' In a word Frankfurter would restrict
the application of § 1983 and claim that it "was not designed
to cure and level all the possible imperfections of local common-law doctrines, but to provide for the case of the defendant who can claim that some particular dispensation of state
authority immunizes him from the ordinary processes of the
IS
law."
In an interesting side-light Frankfurter pointed out that
under the doctrine of Hum v. Oursler" a federal court
might retain jurisdiction of a claim based on § 1983 even
though the court finds that the defendant's conduct is not
under color of state law." Future litigation of claims based on
the Civil Rights Statutes may possibly be expanded by combined application of the precedents established in the Hum
case with the principal case to include individuals acting with-

lence, see e. g., Geach v. Moynahan, 207 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1953); or where
a state prison guard beats a prisoner, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 235
F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956). Federal jurisdiction has also been granted where
an officer without cause arrests or imprisons an "inhabitant" under color
of state law, e. g., Brown v. United State, 204 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1953);
or perhaps even for mere nonfeasance where a state officer fails to discharge his legal duties to protect the victims of mob violence, Catlette v.
United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943). But jurisdiction based on the
Civil Rights Statutes was denied for false imprisonment unless such imprisonment could be shown to be in "pursuance of a systematic policy of
discrimination against a class or group of persons." Truitt v. State of Ill.,
278 F.2d 819, 820 (7th Cir. 1960). Or it has been denied where the complaint merely, failed to allege the purposefulness of the defendant in his
wrongful acts, e.g., Dye v. Cox, 125 F. Supp. 714 (7th Cir. 1953). Jurisdiction has been denied where there was an unlawful search by law officers,
see, e. g., Jennings v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied 349
U.S. 958 (1955)
14.
See Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Snowden v. Hughes, 321
U.S. 1, 16 (1944) where he stated that "(the problem of jurisdiction) is not
to be resolved by abstract considerations such as the fact that every official who purports to wield power conferred by a state is pro tanto the
state. Otherwise every illegal discrimination by a policeman on the beat
would be a state action for purpose of suit in a federal court."
15. Relies primarily on Barney case cited supra at
not 8. See also
Deloach v. Rogers, 268 F.2d 928 (5th Cir 1959); Simmons v. Whitaker, 252
F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1958); Dineen v. Williams, 219 F.2d 428 (9th Cir. 1955);
Miles v. Armstrong, 207 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1953); Collins v. Hardyman, 341
U.S. 651 (1951). See Siegel v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996 (N.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd
180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied 339 U.S. 990,reh. denied 340 U.S.
847 (1950).
16.
81 Sup. Ct. 473, 515 (1961).
17.
289 U.S. 238 (1933). Cited at footnote 73 of the opinion. The doctrine
is that
a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain an action alleging a
"Substantial federal question" in the complaint. This is not defeated by
failure to state a proper cause of action, since this determination calls for
a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction.
18.
See Bell v. Hood. 327 U.S. 678 (1946); Binderup v. Pathe Exch. 263
U.S. 291 (1923); Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487 (1902).
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in their private capacity when some technicality prevents
finding their action to be "under color of" state law.
JOHN F. STONE
COURT INDOUBLE JEOPARDY CONSTITUTIONAL LAW TERPRETATIONS WHEN DEPENDENT IS CHARGED FOR Two OR
MORE OFFENSES ARISING FROM THE SAME ACT. Defendant
threw gasoline into the bedroom of the victims and ignited it.
He was tried and convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one count of arson. Defendant moved to vacate the.
sentences on the second count of attempted murder and on
the count of arson alleging that he was punished three times
for a single act in violation of Penal Code section 654.' The
California Supreme Court held, two justices dissenting, that
the conviction of both arson and attempted murder violated
the statutory and constitutional protection relating to defendant as the arson was merely incidental to the primary
objective of killing the victims. Consequently, defendant could
only be punished for the more serious offense which was attempted murder. The dissent criticized the result on the
ground that the crime of arson and that of attempted murder
belonged to two separate and distinct classes, involving proof
of factual elements not common to the other; therefore the
arson conviction should have been affirmed. Neal v. State,
9 Cal. Rptr. 607 (1961).
It is an ancient principle of common law that one may not
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.' The constitutional guaranties'against double jeopardy are merely declaratory of the common law.' Some states through statutory enactment,' and others by judicial decision,' have extended this
protection against double punishment for separate offenses
arising from the same act. This extension is frequently called
1. Cal. Pen. Code § 654 (Deering 1949). "An act or omission which is
made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case can it be
punished under more than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under either one bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under
any other . . ."
2. State v. Dabato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951).
3. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904); State v. Healy, 136
Minn. 264, 161 N.W. 590 (1917); Commonwealth v. Ramunno, 219 Pa. 204,
68 AtI. 184 (1907).
4. Cal. Pen. Code § 654; N.Y. Penal Law, Consol. Laws, c. 40 § 1938
(McKinney 1949).
5. Crumley v. City of Atlanta, 68 Ga. 69, 22 S.E.2d 181 (1942; State v.
Labato, 7 N.J. 137, 80 A.2d 617 (1951); People v. Savorese, 1 Misc. 2d 305,
114 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1952).

